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On Social Optima of Non-Cooperative Mean Field Games
Sen Li, Wei Zhang, and Lin Zhao
Abstract— This paper studies the connections between mean-
field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We
consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large
population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an
individual cost function. The cost functions of different agents
are coupled through a mean field term that depends on the
mean of the population states. We show that under some mild
conditions any -Nash equilibrium of the mean field game
coincides with the optimal solution to a convex social welfare
optimization problem. The results are proved based on a general
formulation in the functional spaces and can be applied to
a variety of mean field games studied in the literature. Our
result also implies that the computation of the mean field
equilibrium can be cast as a convex optimization problem,
which can be efficiently solved by a decentralized primal dual
algorithm. Numerical simulations are presented to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mean field games study the interactions among a
large population of strategic agents, whose decision making
is coupled through a mean field term that depends on the
statistical information of the overall population [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5]. When the population size is large, each individual
agent has a negligible impact on the mean field term.
This enables characterizing the game equilibrium via the
interactions between the agent and the mean field, instead of
focusing on detailed interactions among all the agents. This
methodology provides realistic interpretation of the micro-
scopic behaviors while maintaining mathematical tractability
in the macroscopic level, enabling numerous applications
in various areas, such as economics [6], [7], networks [8],
demand response [9], [10], [11], among others.
For general mean field games, the strategic interactions
among the agents can be captured by an equation system
that couples a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
with a forward Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation [1], [5].
In the meanwhile, a closely related approach, termed the
Nash Certainty Equivalence [4], [12], was independently
proposed to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the mean
field game. These pioneering results attracted considerable
research effort to work on various mean field game problems.
For instance, a discrete-time deterministic mean field game
was studied in [13]. The mean field equilibrium for a large
population of constrained systems was derived as the fixed
point of some mapping and a decentralized iterative algo-
rithm was proposed to compute the equilibrium. A special
class of the mean field game was studied in [14], [15] and
S. Li, W. Zhang, and L. Zhao are with the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. Email:
{li.2886, zhang.491, zhao.833}@osu. edu
[16], for which there exists a major (dominating) player
that has significant influence on the mean field term and
other agents. The corresponding equilibrium conditions were
derived, and the linear quadratic case was investigated. Most
of the aforementioned results focus on the mean field game
equilibrium without system-level objectives. Different from
these works, the social optima problem was studied in [17]
and [18], where the coordinator designs a cooperative mean
field game whose equilibrium asymptotically achieves social
optimum as the population size goes to infinity. However,
despite the accumulation of the vast literature, the study
of social optima in non-cooperative mean field games is
relatively scarce.
This paper studies the connections between mean field
games and the social welfare optimization problem. We
consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a
large population of non-cooperative agents. Each agent seeks
to minimize a cost functional coupled with other agents
through a mean field term that depends on the average of
the population states. The contributions of this paper include
the following. First, the mean field game is formulated in
functional spaces, which provides a unifying framework that
includes a variety of deterministic and stochastic mean field
games as special cases [4], [11], [13], [19]. Second, we derive
a set of equations to characterize the -Nash equilibrium
of the general mean field game in the functional space.
Comparing with the existing literature [4], [13], our mean
field equations are more general as it allows for convex
individual cost functions and Lipschitz continuous mean field
coupling term, while existing literature mainly focuses on
linear quadratic problems with affine coupling term [4], [13].
Third, we show that if the mean field coupling term is
increasing with respect to the aggregated states, then any
mean field equilibrium is also the solution to a convex social
welfare optimization problem. This result is related to the
work in [17] and [18], but they are different in the rationality
assumptions of the agents: the authors in [17] and [18]
consider a group of agents that are cooperative and seek
socially optimal solutions, while our starting point is that
these agents are non-cooperative and individually incentive
driven. In addition, the solution method proposed in [17] and
[18] achieves social optima when the population size goes to
infinity, while we focus on exact socially optimal solutions
with a finite number of agents.
The aforementioned contributions have important theo-
retical and practical implications. First, they enable us to
evaluate the social performance of the equilibrium of the
mean field games. This is important since in many applica-
tions we care about the efficiency of the game equilibrium,
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and this problem has not been studied in existing mean
field game literature. Second, they imply that computing
the mean field equilibrium is equivalent to solving a convex
social welfare optimization problem. Based on our result, we
can compute the mean field equilibrium by considering the
corresponding social welfare optimization problem, which
can be efficiently solved using various convex optimization
methods. Furthermore, based on our result, some existing
ways to compute the mean field equilibrium [11], [13]
can be interpreted as certain primal-dual algorithms, and
improved algorithms can be proposed to compute the mean
field equilibrium with better convergence properties. These
ideas are validated in numerical simulations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The mean
field game and the social welfare optimization problem
are formulated in Section II. The solution of the game is
characterized in Section III, its connection to social optima
is studied in Section IV, and a primal-dual algorithm is
proposed to efficiently compute the mean field equilibrium
in Section V. Section VI shows simulation results.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section formulates the mean field game and the cor-
responding social welfare optimization problem. The game
is defined in a functional space, which provides a unified
formulation that includes a variety of deterministic and
stochastic mean field games as special cases [4], [11], [13],
[19]. The rest of this section presents the mathematical
formulation of this problem.
A. The Mean Field Game
We consider a general mean field game in a functional
space among N agents. Each agent i is associated with a
state variable xi ∈ Xi, a control input ui ∈ Ui and a noise
input pii ∈ Πi. The state space Xi is a subspace of some
Hilbert space X . For any x, y ∈ X , we denote the inner
product as x · y , and define the norm as ||x|| = √x · x. In
addition, we assume that the control space Ui is a Banach
space, and pii is a random element in a measurable space
(Πi,Bi) with an underlying probability space (Ω,F , P ). In
other words, pii is a measurable mapping with respect to
F/Bi. For each agent i, the state xi is determined by the
control input and the noise input according to the following
relation:
xi = fi(ui, pii), xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ Ui, pii ∈ Πi, (1)
Let Zi denote the σ-algebra on Xi, then we impose the
following assumptions on pii and fi(ui, pii):
Assumption 1: (i) for ∀pii ∈ Πi, pij ∈ Πj , pii and pij are
independent, (ii) for ∀pii ∈ Πi, fi(·, pii) is an affine mapping,
(iii) for ∀ui ∈ Ui, fi(ui, pii(·)) : Ω → Xi is a measurable
mapping with respect to F/Zi.
Based on the above assumptions, xi is also a random
element, and the expectation Exi can be defined accord-
ingly. Throughout the paper, we consider the state xi with
uniformly bounded second moment, i.e., there exists C ≥ 0
such that for all i = 1, . . . , N , we have E||xi||2 ≤ C. In this
case, the admissible control set is the set of control inputs
that satisfy this boundedness condition. We assume it to be
convex.
Assumption 2: The admissible control set, defined as U¯i =
{ui ∈ Ui|xi = fi(ui, pii),E||xi||2 ≤ C}, is a convex set.
For each agent i, we introduce a cost functional of the
system state and control input. The costs of different agents
are coupled through a mean field term that depends on the
average of the population state (or control), and we write it
as follows:
Ji(xi, ui,m) = Vi(xi, ui) + F (m) · xi +G(m), (2)
where m ∈ X is the average of the population state, i.e.,
m =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, F : X → X is the mean field coupling
term, and G : X → R is the cost associated with the mean
field term. We impose the following regularity conditions on
Ji:
Assumption 3: (i) Vi(xi, ui) is convex with respect to
(xi, ui), (ii) F (·) is globally Lipschitz continuous with
constant L on X , (iii) G(m) is Fre´chet differentiable, and
the derivative of G(m) is bounded for any bounded m.
The mean field game can be then formulated as follows:
min
ui
E (Vi(xi, ui) + F (m) · xi +G(m)) (3)
s.t.
xi = fi(ui, pii)m = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i.
(4)
There are several solution concepts for the game prob-
lem, such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
dominant strategy equilibrium, among others. In the context
of mean field games, we usually relax the Nash equilibrium
solution concept by assuming that each agent is indifferent
to an arbitrarily small change . This solution concept is
referred to as the -Nash equilibrium, formally defined as
follows:
Definition 1: (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) is an -Nash equilibrium of the
game (3) if the following inequality holds
EJi(u∗i , u∗−i) ≤ EJi(ui, u∗−i) +  (5)
for all i = 1, . . . , N , and all ui ∈ U¯i, where u−i =
(u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN ) and Ji(ui, u−i) is the compact
notation for (2) after plugging (1) in (2).
At an -Nash equilibrium, each agent can lower his cost by
at most  via deviating from the equilibrium strategy, given
that all other players follow the equilibrium strategy.
Remark 1: The game problem (3) formulates a broad
class of mean field games. As the problem is defined in the
general functional space, it provides a unifying formulation
that includes both discrete-time [11], [13] and continuous-
time system [4] as special cases, and addresses both de-
terministic and stochastic cases. This class of problems
frequently arises in various applications [4], [5], [9], [11],
[13], [17], [19], [20], [21], where F (m) · xi can be either
interpreted as the price multiplied by quantity [7], [22] or
part of the quadratic penalty of the deviation of the system
state from the population mean [4], [17].
B. Examples
This subsection presents two examples of mean field
games. One is a discrete-time deterministic game [13] and
the other is a continuous-time stochastic game [4]. We show
that these two examples are special cases of the formulated
mean field game problem (3).
1) Discrete-time deterministic game: In [13] a determinis-
tic mean field game is formulated in discrete-time as follows:
min
{ui(t),t≥1}
K∑
t=1
(||xi(t)− v(t)| |2 + ||ui(t)| |2) (6)
s.t.
{
xi(t) = αixi(t− 1) + βiui(t)
xi(t) ∈ X ti , ui(t) ∈ U¯ ti , i = 1, . . . , N,
(7)
where xi(t) and ui(t) denote the state and control of agent i
at time t, and vi is the mean field term that satisfies v(t) =
γ
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t)+η. To transform the above game problem to
(3), we stack the control and state at different times to form
the state and control trajectories, i.e., xi = {xi(t), t ∈ T}
and ui = {ui(t), t ∈ T}, where T = {1, . . . ,K}. Similarly,
define v = {v(t), t ∈ T}. Then we have Xi = X 1i ×· · ·×XKi
and Ui = U1i ×· · ·×UKi , which are all Euclidean spaces. In
this case, the discrete time game problem can be transformed
to the following form:
min
ui
||xi||2 + ||v||2 − 2xi · v + ||ui||2. (8)
s.t.
{
xi = Cui +D
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i, i = 1, . . . , N,
(9)
where C is a matrix that depends on αi and βi, and D is
a constant vector. It is easy to verify that the game problem
(8) satisfies Assumption 1-3. Therefore, (8) is a special case
of our proposed mean field game (3).
2) Continuous-time stochastic game: The second example
involves a linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problem
formulated in [4]. The game problem can be written as
follows:
min
{ui(t),t≥0}
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
(xi(t)− v(t))2 + rui(t)2
]
dt (10)
s.t.
{
dxi(t) = (αixi(t) + βiui(t))dt+ σidBi(t)
xi(t) ∈ R, ui(t) ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N,
(11)
where xi(t) and ui(t) denote the state and control for the ith
agent at time t, Bi(t) is a standard scalar Brownian motion,
v(t) = γ
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) + η is the mean field term, and
ρ, r, γ, η > 0 are real constants. Let xi = {xi(t), t ≥ 0}
and ui = {ui(t), t ≥ 0} denote the state and the control,
respectively. The admissible control set is then defined as
U¯i = {ui ∈ Ui|ui ∈ C[0,∞), xi = fi(ui, pii),E||xi||2 ≤
C}, where fi can be defined based on the following relation:
xi(t) =xi(0)e
αit +
∫ t
0
βie
αi(t−s)ui(t)dt
+ σi
∫ t
0
eαi(t−s)dBi(s). (12)
In this case, the state space satisfies Xi = X , which
consists of all real-valued functions that are square integrable
after multiplying a discounting factor, X = {x|x(t) ∈
R,
∫
[0,∞) e
−ρt|x(t)|2dt < ∞}. For each xi and xj in X ,
we define the inner product of xi and xj as follows:
xi · xj =
∫
[0,∞)
e−ρtxi(t)xj(t)dt, (13)
and the norm is defined as ||xi|| = √xi · xi. Note that there
is an isometry mapping between the state space X and the L2
space, and therefore, X is complete. This gives the following
lemma:
Lemma 1: The state space X is a Hilbert space.
Proof: Since L2 space is complete, we show that X is
isomorphic to L2, and therefore it is also complete [23, p.20].
For this purpose, we define the following mapping: g : L2 →
X that satisfies g(·) = {gt(·), t ∈ T} and gt(l(t)) = eρt/2l(t)
for any l(t) ∈ L2. This is a linear surjective mapping and it
can be verified that g(l1(t))·g(l2(t)) = l1(t)·l2(t), where the
left-hand side inner product is defined on X and the right-
hand side inner product is defined on the L2 space. This
indicates that L2 and X are isomorphic, which completes
the proof.
Remark 2: The completeness of the state space is impor-
tant for future discussions. We will elaborate more on this
point in later sections.
Under the inner product defined above, the objective
function of the problem (10) can be transformed to the form
of (3):
Vi(xi, ui) + F (m) · xi +G(m), (14)
where Vi(xi, ui) = ||xi||2 + ||ui||2, F (m) = −2m and
G(m) = ||m||2.
It is easy to verify Assumption 1 in the above example.
To verify Assumption 2, we note that Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) is
convex with respect to (fi(ui, pii), ui), and according to (12),
xi = fi(ui, pii) is an affine operator with respect to ui.
This indicates that Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) is convex with respect
to ui. In addition, according to (14), it is clear that F (m)
is Lipschitz continuous, and G(m) is Fre´chet differentiable
with bounded derivative for a bounded m. This validates
Assumption 2.
To verify Assumption 3, we note that xi is an affine
operator with respect to both ui and pii, which conveniently
leads to the convexity of U¯i. This result can be summarized
in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: The admmissible control set U¯i for the game
problem (10) is convex.
To summarize, the game problem in [4] satisfies all the
assumptions and can be viewed as a special case of the
proposed mean field game (3).
C. The Social Welfare
The game equilibrium characterizes the outcomes of the
interaction of agents with conflicting objectives. At the
equilibrium solution, the conflicts are resolved and each
agent achieves individual cost minimization. However, when
it comes to evaluating the system-level performance, we run
into another hierarchy of conflict: the conflict between the
cost of individual agents and the system-level objective. For
this problem, an important question is under what condition
the game equilibrium is to the best benefit of the overall
system, and is therefore desirable from the system level. We
interpret the system-level objective by the following social
welfare optimization problem:
min
u1,...,uN
E
(
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi, ui) + φ(Em)
)
(15)
s.t.
{
xi = fi(ui, pii)
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N
(16)
where φ : X → R represents the cost for the overall system
to attain the average state. We assume it to be convex and
Fre´chet differentiable.
In general, due to the self-interest seeking nature of the
individual agents, the equilibrium of the mean field game
(3) and the solution to the social welfare optimization prob-
lem (15) are inherently inconsistent. When the mean field
equilibrium coincides with the solution to the social welfare
optimization problem (15), we say the game equilibrium is
socially optimal. The objective of this paper is to study the -
Nash equilibrium of the mean field game (3), and investigate
the conditions under which the game equilibrium is socially
optimal.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE -NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we characterize the -Nash equilibrium of
the mean field game (3) with a set of mean field equations.
Our derivation follows similar ideas in [4] and [13]. However,
as we consider the mean field game in general functional
spaces, our result applies to more general cases than linear
quadratic problems in [4] and [13]. More comparisons can
be found in Remark 3.
To study mean field equilibrium, we note that the cost
function (2) of the individual agent is only coupled through
the mean field term F (m) and G(m), and the impact of the
control input for a single agent on the coupling term vanishes
as the population size goes to infinity. Therefore, in the large
population case we can approximate the agent’s behavior
with the optimal response to a deterministic value y ∈ X that
replaces the mean field term F (m) in the cost function (2).
For this purpose, we define the following optimal response
problem:
µi(y) = arg min
ui
E (Vi(xi, ui) + y · xi) (17)
s.t.
{
xi = fi(ui, pii)
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i,
(18)
where µi(y) denotes the optimal solution to the optimization
problem (17) parameterized by y, and G(m) is regarded
as a constant in (17) that can be ignored. Based on this
approximation, y generates a collection of agent responses.
Ideally, the deterministic mean field term approximation y
guides the individual agents to choose a collection of optimal
responses µi(y) which, in return, collectively generate the
mean field term that is close to the approximation y. This
suggests that we use the following equation systems to
characterize the equilibrium of the mean field game:
µi(y) = arg min
ui∈U¯i
E (Vi(xi, ui) + y · xi) (19)
x∗i = fi(µi(y), pii) (20)
y = F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
, (21)
where the mean field term y induces a collection of responses
that generate y. In the rest of this subsection we show that
the solution to this equation system is an -Nash equilibrium
of the mean field game (3). For this purpose, we first prove
the following lemmas:
Lemma 3: Under Assumption 1(i), if there exists C >
0 such that E||xi||2 ≤ C for all i = 1, . . . , N , and F (·)
is globally Lipschitz continuous, then the following relation
holds for each agent i:∣∣E(F (m) · xi)− F (Em) · Exi∣∣ ≤ N , (22)
where m =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi and limN→∞ N = 0.
Proof: To prove this result, it is clear that we have:∣∣E(F (m) · xi)−F (Em) · Exi∣∣ = ∣∣I1 + I2∣∣ ≤∣∣I1∣∣+ ∣∣I2∣∣,
where we define I1 as I1 = E
(
F (m) · xi
) − EF (m) · Exi
and I2 = EF (m) ·Exi −F (Em) ·Exi. To show that
∣∣I1∣∣ is
bounded by some , we notice that:∣∣I1∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (m) · xi)−EF (m) · Exi∣∣ = ∣∣I3 + I4∣∣ ≤∣∣I3∣∣+ ∣∣I4∣∣,
where we define I3 = E
(
F (m) ·xi
)−E(F (m−i) ·xi), I4 =
E
(
F (m−i) · xi
)− E(F (m) · Exi) and m−i = 1
N
∑
j 6=i xj .
Since F (·) is Lipschitz continuous with the constant L ≥ 0,
and the second moment of xi is bounded, we have:∣∣I3∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (m) · xi)− E(F (m−i) · xi)∣∣ ≤
E
∣∣F (m) · xi − F (m−i) · xi∣∣ ≤ E(∥∥ L
N
xi
∥∥∥∥xi∥∥) =
L
N
E||xi||2 ≤ LC
N
.
In addition, as xi is independent with m−i, we have∣∣I4∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (m−i) · xi)− E(F (m) · Exi)∣∣ =∣∣EF (m−i) · Exi − EF (m) · Exi∣∣ ≤ L
N
∥∥Exi∥∥2.
Note that E||xi||2 is bounded, and thus
∥∥Exi∥∥ is also
bounded:∥∥Exi∥∥ ≤ E∥∥xi∥∥ = E√||xi||2 ≤√E||xi||2 ≤ √C.
This indicates that
∣∣I4∣∣ ≤ LC
N
. Therefore,
∣∣I1∣∣ ≤ ∣∣I3∣∣ +∣∣I4∣∣ ≤ 2LC
N
. To show that
∣∣I2∣∣ converges to 0, we define
a random variable rN = F (m) − F (Em). Since xi and
xj are independent and have bounded second moment, by
the L2 weak law of large numbers, m converges to Em in
L2 as N goes to infinity (can be easily proved in infinite-
dimensional case). Therefore, m converges to Em in L1, i.e.,
limN→∞ E||m− Em|| = 0. In addition, we have:
||rN || = ||F (m)− F (Em)|| ≤ L||m− Em||.
Therefore, limN→∞ E||rN || ≤ limN→∞ EL||m−Em|| = 0
This indicates that:
I2 ≤
∥∥EF (m)− F (Em)∥∥∥∥Exi∥∥ ≤ √CN .
This completes the proof.
Lemma 4: Define m =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, and let m−i =
1
N
∑
j 6=i xj , where xi denotes the state trajectory corre-
sponding to ui in U¯i, then we have the following relation:∣∣EG(m)− EG(m−i)∣∣ ≤ N (23)
Proof: For notation convenience, we use iN to denote
a sequence that converges to 0 for any fixed i as N goes to
infinity, i.e., limN→∞ iN = 0, where i = 1, 2, . . .. To prove
this lemma, we can show that |EG(m) − G(Em)| ≤ 1N
and |EG(m−i)−G(Em−i)| ≤ 2N using the same argument
as in the proof of Lemma 3. Then it suffices to show that
|G(Em) − G(Em−i)| ≤ 3N . This is true since ||Em||
is bounded in a compact set, and G(Em) has bounded
derivative for any bounded Em.
Using the result of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we can show
that the solution to the equation system (19)-(21) is an -Nash
equilibrium of the mean field game (3), which is summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The solution to the equation system (19)-(21),
is an N -Nash equilibrium of the mean field game (3), and
limN→∞ N = 0.
Proof: For notation convenience, we denote the solution
to the equation system (19)-(21) as u∗i , x
∗
i and y
∗, where
x∗i is the state trajectory corresponding to u
∗
i . To prove this
theorem, we need to show that:
E
(
Vi(x
∗
i , u
∗
i ) + F (m
∗) · x∗i +G(m∗)
)
≤ N+
E
(
Vi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
xi +m
∗
−i
)
· xi +G
(
1
N
xi +m
∗
−i
))
for all ui ∈ U¯i, where m∗ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i , m
∗
−i =
1
N
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j , and xi is the state trajectory corresponding to
ui. Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, it suffices to show
that:
EVi(x∗i , u∗i ) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Ex∗i ≤
EVi(xi,ui) + F
(
1
N
E
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
x∗j
)) · Exi + 1N . (24)
Since ||Exi|| is bounded (see proof for Lemma 3) and F (·)
is Lipschitz continuous with constant L ≥ 0, we have:∣∣∣∣F( 1N E(xi+∑
j 6=i
x∗j )
)
· Exi − F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Exi
∣∣∣∣ ≤∥∥ 1
N
L(Exi − Ex∗i )
∥∥∥∥Exi∥∥ = 2N . (25)
Therefore, combining (24) and (25), it suffices to show that:
EVi(x∗i ,u∗i ) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Ex∗i ≤
EVi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Exi + 3N .
Note that based on (21), F
(
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i
)
= y∗, which is
equivalent to:
EVi(x∗i , u∗i ) + y∗ · Ex∗i ≤ EVi(xi, ui) + y∗ · Exi + 3N .
This obviously holds based on (19), which completes the
proof.
Theorem 1 indicates that each agent is motivated to follow
the equilibrium strategy u∗i as deviating from this strategy
can only decrease the individual cost by a negligible amount
N . Furthermore, this N can be arbitrarily small, if the
population size is sufficiently large.
Remark 3: Our result in Theorem 1 generalizes existing
works in ([4] and [13]) from several perspectives. First, these
works mainly focus on linear quadratic problem, while we
consider a general mean field game formulated in the func-
tional space. Therefore, our result applies to more general
cases than quadratic individual costs. Furthermore, the mean
field coupling term F (·) is assumed to be affine in [4] and
[13], while we relax it to be Lipschitz continuous. In the
affine case, the order of expectation and the function F (·) can
be interchanged, which significantly simplifies the proof of
Lemma 3. On the other hand, our generalization also comes
at a cost: since F (·) is Lipschitz continuous, we can not
derive the convergence rate of  as in [4].
IV. CONNECTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE OPTIMIZATION
This section tries to connect the mean field game (3) to
the social welfare optimization problem (15). Since the social
welfare (15) involves the sum of individual cost functions,
the key idea is to decompose the social welfare optimization
problem into individual cost minimization problems. To this
end, we note that while the first term of (15) is separable over
ui, the second term φ(·) couples the decisions of each agent
and makes the decomposition difficult. To address this issue,
we introduce an augmented decision variable z to denote
the average of the expectation of the population state, i.e.,
z =
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 xi. The social welfare maximization problem
(15) can be then transformed to the following form:.
min
u1,...,uN ,z
E
(
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi, ui) + φ(z)
)
(26)
s.t.

z =
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
xi (27a)
xi = fi(ui, pii),∀i = 1, . . . , N (27b)
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N (27c)
It is obvious that this problem (26) and the social welfare
optimization problem (15) are equivalent, but the advan-
tage of this transformation is that the objective function is
now separable over its decision variables (u1, . . . , uN , z),
and dual decomposition can be applied to decompose the
problem into individual cost minimization problems. This
can be done by incorporating the constraint (27a) in the
Lagrangian of the objective function, and obtaining the
following equation:
L(u, z, λ) =
N∑
i=1
EVi(xi, ui) + φ(z)
+ λ ·
(
E
N∑
i=1
xi −Nz
)
(28)
where u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and x = (x1, . . . , xN ). Note that
the completeness of X is important in this derivation. If X
is not complete, then the inner product term in (28) should
be replaced by a linear operator. In this case, since the mean
field equations have inner product term, they can not be
connected to the socially optimal solution. This elaborates
Remark 2.
For notation convenience, we define Li(ui, λ) =
EVi(xi, ui) + λ ·Exi to be the Lagrangian for the ith agent,
and denote L0(z, λ) = φ(z)−Nλ ·z as the Lagrangian for a
virtual agent (social planner), then the dual problem of (26)
can be written as follows:
max
λ
min
u1,...,uN ,z
N∑
i=1
Li(ui, λ) + L0(z, λ), (29)
s.t.
{
xi = fi(ui, pii),∀i = 1, . . . , N (30a)
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i,∀i = 1, . . . , N (30b)
Since the dual problem is fully decomposible, we can de-
compose it into individual problems so as to connect the
dual solution to the mean field equilibrium. Furthermore, if
the duality gap of the social welfare optimization problem
is zero, then the mean field equilibrium is socially optimal.
The main result of this paper can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 2: Let φ(·) satisfies F (z) = 1
N
φ′(z) for ∀z ∈
X , and assume that the Slater condition holds for the
social welfare optimization problem (26), i.e., U¯i has at
least one interior point, then any solution to the mean field
equations (19)-(21) is also the solution to the social welfare
optimization problem (26), and vice versa.
Proof: We first note that since the social welfare
optimization problem is convex, and the Slater condition
holds, then the duality gap between (26) and (29) is
zero, and there exists a dual solution to (29), denoted as
(λd, ud1, . . . , u
d
N , z
d), such that primal constraints are satis-
fied [24, p. 224], i.e., zd =
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 x
d
i . To prove the theo-
rem, if suffices to show that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the solution to (29) and the solution to the
mean field equations (19)-(21). Since (λd, ud1, . . . , u
d
N , z
d) is
the optimal solution to (29), the following relations holds:
udi = arg min
ui
Li(ui, λ
d) (31)
s.t.
{
xi = fi(ui, pii)
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ U¯i
(32)
and we also have:
zd = arg min
z∈X
L0(z, λ
d) (33)
Based on the definition (17), the equation (31) is equivalent
to udi = µi(λ
d), which is the same as equation (19). As φ(·)
is convex, we take the derivative of the objective function in
(33) to be 0 and then (33) is equivalent to λd =
1
N
φ(zd)′ =
F (zd), where the second equality is due to the assumption
of this theorem. Note that at optimal solution, we have
zd =
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 x
d
i . Therefore, λ
d = F
(
1
N
E(
∑N
i=1 x
d
i )
)
,
which is equivalent to (19). This indicates that the optimality
condition of the dual problem is equivalent to the mean field
equations (19)-(21). This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 establishes the connection between the mean
field equilibrium and the social welfare optimization prob-
lem. This connection is important in several perspectives.
First, it enables to evaluate the system-level performance of
the mean field game. In particular, when a mean field game is
given, we know under what condition the game equilibrium
is socially optimal. Second, our result indicates that com-
puting the mean field equilibrium is essentially equivalent
to solving a convex social welfare optimization problem.
Therefore, we can compute the mean field equilibrium by
considering the corresponding social welfare optimization
problem, which can be efficiently solved by various convex
optimization methods.
Remark 4: In this paper, we formulate the mean field
term F (·) to depend on the average of the population state.
However, the proposed method still works when the mean
field is the average of the control decisions. In this case, the
individual cost (2) is defined as Ji(xi, ui, F (m), G(m)) =
Vi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
)
· ui + G
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
)
, and
the constraint (27a) is z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui, then the same result
as Theorem 2 can be obtained by a similar approach.
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Fig. 1. The SOC of a randomly selected electric
vehicle under ADMM.
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Fig. 2. The control decision of a randomly
selected electric vehicle.
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Fig. 3. The average control decision of the
population in two algorithms.
V. COMPUTING THE MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM VIA
PRIMAL-DUAL
In this section we propose a decentralized algorithm to
compute the mean field equilibrium based on Theorem
2. When a mean field game (3) is given, instead of di-
rectly solving the equation systems (19)-(21), we construct
a social welfare maximization problem (15) by finding a
cost functional φ(·) such that φ(z)′ = NF (z). According
to Theorem 2, the optimal solution to the social welfare
maximization problem (15) is the -Nash equilibrium of the
mean field game. Therefore, the -Nash equilibrium of the
mean field game can be derived by solving (15). To obtain a
decentralized algorithm, we consider the dual form of (15).
The dual problem can be written as (29), which can be
efficiently solved by the following primal-dual algorithm:
ui ← arg min
ui∈U¯i
(Vi(xi, ui) + λ · xi) (34)
z ← arg min
z∈X
φ(z)− λ · z (35)
λ← λ+ βN( 1
N
N∑
i=1
Efi(ui, pii)− z) (36)
In the proposed algorithm, we introduce a virtual social
planner to represent the cost minimization problem (35). To
implement the algorithm, an initial guess for the Lagrangian
multiplier λ is broadcast to all the agents and the social
planner, who subsequently solve the primal problem. The
primal problem can be decomposed over all the agents.
Therefore, each agent can independently solve the stochastic
programming problem (34), while the virtual agent solves the
deterministic optimization problem (35) for a given λ. The
solution of the primal problems are collected and used to up-
date the dual λ according to (36). The updated dual variable
is then broadcast to the agents again and this procedure is
iterated until it converges to the socially optimal solution. It
can be verified that the proposed algorithm includes many
existing ways to compute the mean field equilibrium special
cases. For instance, the algorithms proposed in [11] and [13]
are equivalent to the primal-dual algorithm with a scaled
stepsize in (36), i.e., with a different value of β. Using this
insight, we can propose improved algorithms to compute the
mean field equilibrium with better numerical properties, such
as the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM).
By adding proximal regularization in the Lagrangian, the
ADMM method converges under more general conditions
[25] , and converges faster than the proposed dual decom-
position algorithm with appropriately selected step sizes.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In the case study, we consider the problem of coordinating
the charging of a population of electric vehicles (EV) [13].
Each EV is modeled as a linear dynamic system, and the
objective is to acquire a charge amount within a finite horizon
while minimizing the charging cost. The charging cost of
each EV is coupled through the electricity price, which is an
affine function of the average of charging energy. This leads
to the following game problem [13]:
min
ui
η||ui − z||2 + 2γ(z + c)Tui (37)
subject to:{
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ui(t)
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ x¯i, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i,
∑T
t=1 ui(t) = γi,
where 2γ(z + c)T denotes the electricity price, and the first
term η||ui−z||2 penalizes the deviation from average control
inputs. Note that the first term is mainly added for numerical
stability [13], we can let η << γ. In this example, ui(t)
denotes the charging energy during the tth control period,
xi(t) ∈ R is the state of charge (scaled by the capacity) of the
EV battery, x¯i is the battery capacity, and the electricity price
is 2γ(z+c). The case study section focuses on computing the
mean field equilibrium of (37). We note that (37) is slightly
different from (3) in the sense that the coupling term depends
on the average of control instead of the state. However, based
on Remark 4, there is no essential difference between these
two formulations, and our result applies universally.
In [13], the mean field equilibrium of (37) is computed
by a scaled version of the algorithm (34)-(36). If we let
βk to denote the stepsize of (36) during the kth iteration,
then it is shown that the proposed algorithm converges to
the mean field equilibrium of (37) if limk→∞ βk = 0 and
limk→∞
∑k
m=1 βk = ∞. Under this choice of stepsize, the
algorithm is referred to as the Mann iteration, and we will
use it as the benchmark.
Theorem 2 indicates that the mean field game (37) has
the same solution as a convex social welfare optimization
problem if F (z) =
1
N
φ′(z). Since F (z) = 2(γ − η)z, then
we have φ(z) = N(γ − η)zT z. Therefore, we can compute
the mean field equilibrium of (37) by solving the following
convex social welfare optimization problem:
min
(u1,...,uN )
N∑
i=1
(
η||ui||2 + 2γcTui
)
+N(γ − η)zT z (38)
subject to:
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
xt+1i = xi(t) + ui(t), ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ x¯i, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i,
∑T
t=1 ui(t) = γi, .
where I = {1, . . . , N} and K = {1, . . . ,K}. To solve this
problem, we propose to use alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM). For algorithm details, please see [25].
Now we compare the performance of the ADMM algo-
rithm with the benchmark algorithm. In the simulation ,
we generate 100 sets of EV parameters over 36 control
periods, and each period spans 5 minutes. The heterogeneous
parameters, including the capacity of the EV batteries, the
maximum charging rate of the batteries, and the other
parameters in the objective function are all generated based
on uniform distributions. We run both Mann iterations and
ADMM for 200 iterations, and the simulation results are
shown in Fig. 1-3. In Fig. 1, we randomly select an EV and
show its state of charge trajectory under the ADMM solution.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, in order to compare the performance
between ADMM and the Mann iteration, we show ||ui||
for a randomly selected EV and the average control input
||z|| over each iteration. Based on the simulation results, the
ADMM algorithm convergences to the optimal solution after
about 50 iterations, while the Mann iteration converges after
100 iterations. Therefore, it is clear that ADMM converges
faster than the benchmark algorithm. We point out that the
algorithm converges only if both z and ui converge. In Fig. 3,
although the Mann iteration quickly approaches the optimal
solution after a few iterations, it oscillates around the optimal
solution and does not converge until after 100 iterations. This
can be verified with Fig. 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the connections between a class of
mean field games and the social welfare optimization prob-
lem. We derived the mean field equations for the mean field
game in functional spaces, and showed that the game equi-
librium coincides with the solution to a convex social welfare
optimization problem. Based on the relation between the
mean field game and the social welfare optimization prob-
lem, efficient algorithms can be developed to compute the
mean field equilibrium by solving the corresponding convex
social welfare optimization problem. Numerical simulations
are presented to validate the proposed approach. Future work
includes extending the proposed approach to the case of
infinitely many agents and more general formulations where
the mean field term depends on the probability distribution
of the population state.
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